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Purchase money antideficiency protection: 
Lawler v Jacobs, 2000 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Buyer is not personally liable after defaulting on purchase money note secured by deed of 
trust on real property, despite agreement to contrary, due to antideficiency protection of 
CCP §580b. 
Lawler v Jacobs (2000) 83 CA4th 723, 100 CR2d 52 
After Lawler purchased 128 acres of unimproved ranch land, he sold off 91 acres to two 
developers for a $6 million cash down payment and a $3 million purchase money note secured 
by the real property. At Lawler’s insistence, the developers agreed to remain personally liable for 
the unpaid debt in the case of default, notwithstanding the antideficiency law (CCP §580b). 
Lawler agreed to subordinate his note to an acquisition/construction loan so the buyers could 
subdivide and complete infrastructure improvements. 
The developers stopped payments on both loans after the town downzoned the lot size from a 
5-acre minimum lot size to 7.5-acre lot size. Lawler sued (1) to foreclose his deed of trust and (2) 
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, alleging that the developers never intended to honor 
their promise to remain personally liable on the note. The jury awarded Lawler $3 million for his 
deficiency, plus fees and interest. 
The court of appeal reversed. Under CCP §580b, a seller is barred from obtaining a deficiency 
judgment for the unpaid purchase price secured by a trust deed on the property purchased. This 
policy, whereby the seller assumes the risk that the value of the security may become inadequate, 
is intended to discourage sellers from overvaluing the security (thus discouraging precarious land 
promotion schemes) and to “halt the march of declining property values that would otherwise 
occur during a depression if defaulting buyers were burdened with great personal liability.” 83 
CA4th at 732. 
Lawler argued that §580b applies only to standard purchase money transactions and that the 
subordination of his loan placed the transaction outside the intended scope of §580b under 
Spangler v Memel (1972) 7 C3d 603, 102 CR 807, and DeBerard Props., Ltd. v Lim (1999) 20 
C4th 659, 85 CR2d 292. The court of appeal disagreed, however, holding that the requirements 
for avoiding §580b were absent. The amount of the loan did not “dwarf” the value of the 
property at the time of the sale and the use of the property did not change or intensify during the 
developer’s ownership. Moreover, the developers were not in a better position to assess the 
property’s value and evaluate the risks. The risks nvolved in this venture were well known to 
Lawler. Accordingly, the court concluded that the parties could not waive the explicit and 
unambiguous language of the statute and its attendant public policy.  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: It’s pretty clear that a seller who agreed to subordinate to an $8.2 
million line of credit to cover both acquisition and development costs does not get the benefit of 
Spangler antideficiency protection when the development costs are never funded by the credit 
lender. That’s Budget Realty, Inc. v Hunter (1984) 157 CA3d 511, 204 CR 48, all over again. So 
the holding in this decision is straightforward; it’s all the dicta surrounding it that is so killing.  
The Spangler exception originally required three conditions: (1) a sale of real property for 
commercial development, (2) the subordination of the seller’s purchase money loan to (3) a 
construction loan. The Spangler opinion stressed those three considerations several times. 
Although I was one of many who thought that these di tinctions did not make too much sense 
(the logic seemed to apply equally well to situations not strictly defined by the three conditions), 
at least the standards were objective and clearly told parties what they could and could not do.  
But that was before DeBerard Props., Ltd. v Lim rewrote Spangler. While DeBerard was 
obviously significant in its own right—holding that CCP §580b could not be waived, even 
during a post-execution workout—in that opinion, Justice Mosk also mentioned that the seller 
had urged the court to create another Spangler-type exception to §580b. In refusing to do so, 
Mosk added that Spangler was different because there was no construction loa (a point already 
acknowledged by the seller); he also volunteered some new limiting features of the Spangler rule 
(20 C4th at 666):  
[A] pronounced intensification of . . . post-sale use. . . . [C]onstruction financing that dwarfs the 
property’s value. . . . [T]he purchaser must be in a much better position than the vendor to assess 
the property’s possible value. . . . [Emphasis added.]  
The italicized words show how narrow the Spangler standard has become, as gratuitously 
described in DeBerard. And Lawler v Jacobs now treats these DeBerard glosses as the new rule 
(83 CA4th at 735):  
[T]here was no construction financing that dwarfed the property’s value. . . . [C]onstruction 
financing did not further a “pronounced intensificat on”. . . . [A]ppellants were not in a “much 
better position” than Lawler to assess the property’s value. . . .  
This, too, of course, is dicta, because there was no actual construction financing to implicate 
the rule of Spangler in the first place, but it tells us that, even when there is subordination to 
construction financing, Spangler may nevertheless not be applied if the new adjectiv s are not 
also deemed satisfied. 
The original Spangler opinion told sellers when they could and could not get around §580b. 
But the new adjectives are too subjective to offer similar guidance. How large does a 
construction loan have to be in order to “dwarf” the seller’s carryback? How much development 
must be contemplated in order for the intensification to be “pronounced”? How much extra 
knowledge must the purchaser possess in order to occupy that “much better” position than the 
vendor? With rhetorical qualifications like these, a former safe harbor has turned into a rather 
unstormworthy anchorage.  —Roger Bernhardt 
 
